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intRoduCtoRy RemaRks
by Charles E. Di Leva*
The path toward an international climate framework was intensely debated in Durban at the seventeenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties (“COP17”) to the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”), which took place between November 28 and 
December 9, 2011.1 It was not until two days after the sched-
uled close of the Conference that the Parties were able to forge 
a compromise.2
This landmark decision was noted worldwide.3 The 
UNFCCC’s 195 State Parties overcame substantial negotiating 
differences, committing to adopt a decision by 2015 that would 
contain emission reductions applicable to both developed and 
major emitting developing countries, with the decision coming 
into force by 2020.4 Parties also agreed to submit proposals on 
the path toward this decision as part of the “Durban Platform” 
as soon as three months after the close of COP 17.5 With China, 
India, and the United States hammering out the final details of 
the agreement, this compromise seemed a historic step forward.6
Even with a compromise agreed upon in Durban charting 
the path toward a global agreement, the situation surrounding 
climate law remains troubled. This concern became clear the 
Monday following the Durban agreement, when carbon markets 
sank.7 The situation for carbon markets several months later 
is no better, even in light of the European Union’s legal commit-
ment to twenty percent emissions reductions by 2020, and its 
related emissions trading scheme.8
Why do these concerns remain so prominent, and what 
challenges do they pose for those committed to addressing what 
many view as the greatest challenge facing humankind?
Economically, the concerns remain prominent because inter-
national environmental agreements are expensive to implement 
and the responsibilities for historic emissions fall on countries 
whose economies seem to face lower rates of growth than those 
countries who have not assumed legally binding commitments.9 
Thus, some challenges are indeed linked to the global economic 
imbalance and recession. Others may reflect the problem 
of having “climate winners and losers.” It has been noted that 
global warming, and the resulting ice cap melt, may harbor 
vast economic gains as mineral resources and shipping routes 
become accessible for the first time.10 The resulting economic 
and political imbalances make it difficult to forge a global regu-
latory framework that can enable a successful carbon market to 
solidify and grow. Without such a framework, the private sector 
that provides most of the world’s capital for clean energy may 
well have less incentive to invest and the range of carbon legal 
transactions may recede.
As well, within weeks after Durban, the political divide 
between developed and developing countries was evident again. 
As just one example, the Durban Platform submission by China 
to the UNFCCC Secretariat of March 5th made it clear that the 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities had not 
moved much from its initial inscription in 1992.11 Their submission 
stated as follows:
Under the circumstances of a lack of finance and technol-
ogy support from the developed country Parties and being  
confronted with the challenges of economic and 
social development as well as poverty eradication, 
developing country Parties have made their greatest 
efforts to take mitigation actions, whose contributions 
to mitigation are much greater than those of devel-
oped country Parties. Social and economic develop-
ment and poverty eradication are first and overriding 
priorities of developing country Parties. Whether 
the developing country Parties could enhance their 
actions both on mitigation and adaptation depends 
on the enhanced finance and technology supports  
by developed country Parties.12
Despite these economic and political divisions, there is hope 
for climate change and the law. Some hope for climate change 
law can be gleaned by a historical perspective, as well as by some 
recent developments and trends. From the historical viewpoint, 
climate law and practice has shown steady growth with some 
oscillation, notably linked to the current recession. Indeed, when 
I attended the final UNFCCC negotiating session in 1992, it 
would have been difficult to envision today’s plethora of climate 
related courses, textbooks, blogs, and advocacy groups.
For the World Bank too, engagement in climate and related 
legal work has continuously grown. At the carbon transaction 
level, climate change efforts began in only two countries with 
small pilot actions handling a few million dollars, up to the point 
that the Kyoto Protocol became a reality.13 Today, the Bank man-
ages $2.5 billion in carbon funds, $7 billion in climate investment 
funds (along with other development Banks), and has hundreds 
of millions in renewable energy projects that are growing every 
year.14 New funds dealing with United Nations Collaborative 
Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation in Developing Countries “Plus” and related 
land and agriculture projects are growing;15 the same is true for 
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carbon and climate related funds at many international organiza-
tions. Clean energy portfolios in all development organizations 
are growing and here to stay.16 Not only do they make good 
economic sense, they deliver social, environmental and health 
benefits.17 Because of these results, and the trend of climate 
science, there will continue to be regulatory regimes that sup-
port the development of climate law, as evident in regional 
and domestic schemes. This is true of large regimes like the 
European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, as well as single 
jurisdictions like California.
Indeed, today, a wide range of climate friendly actions may 
eventually qualify under the Durban Platform’s “new market 
mechanism” or, in the case of projects in developing countries, 
become eligible for support from the Green Climate Fund or 
other financing mechanism, or may simply move ahead with 
domestic funding alone.18 From developing countries, some of 
these efforts will support their nationally appropriate mitigation 
activities (“NAMAs”). Perhaps today’s climate law practitioners 
can help China fulfill a commitment linked to its 12th Five Year 
Plan.19 The plan aims to reduce emission intensity by forty to 
forty-five percent from 2005 levels by 2020.20 Today’s practi-
tioners can help China establish a domestic emissions trading 
scheme in cities and provinces with the objective of setting up a 
national scheme in 2015.21 Lawyers will be needed in India as 
well, as it proceeds with plans to reduce emissions and puts in 
place a “performance and trade system.”22 Additionally, Brazil, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam, are just a few of the develop-
ing countries to join China and India in a World Bank-managed 
Partnership for Market Readiness.23 This partnership will help 
put in place domestic incentive measures such as laws and regu-
lations that help carbon markets to grow.24
Even without the development of carbon markets, the 
Durban Platform recognizes that there is growing interest in 
other sectors to effectuate measures to reduce emissions or 
improve efficiency.25 These measures will require lawyers to 
help develop laws, regulations, and innovative financial packages 
that will help channel the necessary finance.26 Thus, going for-
ward from Durban, Parties can now submit proposals for carbon 
emission reductions linked to carbon capture and storage, 
provided that such activities have a solid domestic legal frame-
work.27 Similarly, projects that achieve reductions in emissions 
from deforestation and forest degradation will have to be based 
on a legal regime that can address a wide range of environmental 
and social safeguards. Parties will also review submissions on 
how to improve agricultural practices in a manner that sequesters 
carbon as well. Many of these projects will also require a sound 
understanding of relevant land law and other related legal mat-
ters. Lawyers will be needed in a wide range of related settings, 
such as negotiations surrounding ways to address emissions 
related to aviation and bunker fuels, or the heavily contested 
litigation concerning the European Union Aviation charges.28
Perhaps most compelling, climate law practitioners will 
be called upon to address a growing array of social challenges. 
Science has demonstrated why we are witnessing climate migra-
tion due to sea level rise, or changing weather patterns. These 
often tragic circumstances will require careful balancing of 
rights and responsibilities, grounded in both international and 
domestic law. In such settings, scientists will predict the pat-
terns, and economists will portray the costs, but lawyers will 
have to shape just outcomes for the growing number of those 
who are affected.
In sum, just as one could not have fully predicted in 1992 
the wide range of legal talents the climate regime has absorbed 
the past twenty years, it is equally uncertain the extent to which 
lawyers will be necessary going forward. However, if the past is 
a guide, the demands for climate change will only grow.
Endnotes: Introductory Remarks
1 See What is COP17/CMP7?, Cop17/Cmp7, http://www.cop17-cmp7 
durban.com/en/about-cop17-cmp7/what-is-cop17-cmp7.html (last visited Apr. 
3, 2012).
2 Paul Manning, COP 17 Climate Change Agreement in Durban: the Politics 
of Compromise, ehs J. (Dec. 15, 2011), http://ehsjournal.org/http:/ehsjournal.
org/paul-manning/cop-17-climate-change-agreement-in-durban-the-politics- 
of-compromise/2011/; see also Annalisa Savaresi, Int’l Center for Climate  
Governance, The Durban Outcome: A Survey of Opinions (Jan. 2012), http://
www.iccgov.org/publications/files/reflections/01_reflection_january_2012.pdf.
3 Manning, supra note 2.
4 See Forum for Env’t, Summary of Durban Outcomes of the 17th Session of 
the Conference of the Parties (COP17/CMP7), http://climatecapacity.org/files/
SVNews/Durban%20Report%20of%20ECSNCC.pdf; see also Savaresi, supra 
note 2.
5 Manning, supra note 2.
6 Positive Outcome in Durban as US, China and India Agree to Work 
Together, point CaRbon (Dec. 12, 2011, 3:56pm), http://www.pointcarbon.com/
aboutus/pressroom/pressreleases/1.1700632.
7 Alessandro Torello, EU Carbon-Permit Prices Close Down After Durban 
Deal, wall st. J. Online (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:49 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052970203430404577094443960862340.html.
8 See EU ETS Phase III (2013- 2020), u.k. dep’t of eneRgy and Climate 
Change, http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/emissions/eu_ets/phase_iii/
phase_iii.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
9 See Savaresi, supra note 2.
10 See, e.g. Kathryn Isted, Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial 
Disputes & Environmental Policy Considerations, 18 J. tRansnat’l l. & pol’y 
343, 347 (2009).
11 UNFCCC, Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced 
Action, First Session, Bonn, May 17-24, 2012, China’s Submission on Options 
and Ways for Further Increasing the Level of Ambition, U.N. Doc. FCCC/
ADP/2012/Misc.1, unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/adp1/eng/misc01.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2012).
12 Id. at 7.
13 Id.
14 Carbon Finance, the woRld bank, http://web.worldbank.org/ (last updated 
Aug. 2011); Summary of Funds and Facilities, the woRld bank, http://
go.worldbank.org/MZZJZ5O4L0 (last visited Apr. 2, 2012); see generally 10 
Years of Experience in Carbon Finance: Insights from working with carbon 
markets for development & global greenhouse gas mitigation the woRld bank 
(Dec. 2009), www.carbonfinance.org.
continued on page 52
52 SuStainable Development law & policy
Endnotes: intRoduCtoRy RemaRks
  continued from page 5
15 See The Global Climate Change Regime, CounCil on foReign Relations, 
http://www.cfr.org/climate-change/global-climate-change-regime/p21831 (last 
updated November 21, 2011); see generally REDD+ Social & Environmental 
Standards Factsheet, Redd+ses, http://www.redd-standards.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2012).
16 See U.N. Research Inst. for Social Dev., The Global Political Economy of 
REDD+: Engaging Social Dimensions in the Emerging Green Economy, 7-10 
(Dec. 2011)(Rocio Hiraldo and Thomas Tanner).
17 See Id. at 1-3, 7-11; see also UNEP Finance Initiative, REDDy Set Grow, Part 1:  
A briefing for financial institutions: Opportunities and roles for financial insti-
tutions in forest carbon markets, 28-30 (May 2011), www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/ 
documents/reddysetgrow.pdf.
18 See Climate aCtion netwoRk-int’l, Can-i submission on a new  
maRket-based meChanism (March 2012), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2012/
smsn/ngo/176.pdf; see generally Forum for Env’t, supra note 4, at 8-10.
19 See Climate aCtion netwoRk-int’l, views on options and ways to  





22 Robin Lancaster, Ready, Steady, Go: The Partnership for Market Readiness 
is Sowing the Seeds for Carbon Trading in Several Developing Countries,  
CaRbon tRading Feb. 2012, at 16, http://issuu.com/carbon-tradingmagazine/
docs/carbon_trading_february_2012-1.
23 See About the Partnership for Market Readiness (PMR), the woRld bank 
CaRbon fin. unit, http://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=PMR&FID= 
61218&ItemID=61218&ft=About (last visited Apr. 2, 2012).
24 See Durban Conference Delivers Breakthrough in International Community’s  
Response to Climate Change, united nations, http://www.un.org/wcm/content/
site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-negotiations/durban (last visited Apr. 
2, 2012); see generally United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change, Draft Dec. –/CP-17, Conference of the Parties, Green Climate  
Fund-Report of the Transitional Committee, 17th Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 9, 2011, 
U.N. Doc. fCCC/Cp/2011/l.9 (Dec. 10, 2011), http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/
durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_gcf.pdf
25 See Ernst & Young, Durban dynamics: navigating for progress on climate 
change, 1-15, http://www.ey.com/ZA/en/Newsroom/News-releases/2011—
Press-Release—November—Ernst—Young-report-indicates-possible-US-
45-billion-climate-change-funding-gap-ahead-of-COP-17 (last visited Apr. 2, 
2012) (discussing financial aspects of climate change from a global perspective).
26 See Forum for Env’t, supra note 4, at 8-11.
27 See CAN-International submission on how to address drivers of deforesta-
tion and forest degradation, Climate Action Network-International (Feb. 20, 
2012), http://www.climatenetwork.org/publication/can-submission-how-
address-drivers-deforestation-and-forest-degradation-feb-2012 (discussing  
measures necessary for REDD+ to succeed, including both domestic and  
international factors).
28 See Daniel Michaels, EU’s Airline-Emissions Fees Face Challenge, the 
wall stReet JouRnal (Feb. 16, 2010 1:10 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970204059804577227173526305492.html; see generally UK 
Environment Agency, EU Emissions Trading System – Aviation, http://www.
environment-agency.gov.uk/business/topics/pollution/107596.aspx (last updated 
March 23, 2012).
Endnotes: unConstRuCtive ambiguity in the duRban Climate deal of Cop 17 / Cmp 7
  continued from page 11
4 The two most notable decisions implementing the Cancun Agreements 
were the decision launching the Green Climate Fund and the decision on many 
operational modalities that were under discussion on the Ad-Hoc Working 
Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action (“AWG-LCA”). See UNFCCC, Draft 
Dec. –/CP-17, Conference of the Parties, Green Climate Fund-Report of the 
Transitional Committee, 17th Sess., Nov. 28-Dec. 9, 2011, U.N. Doc. fCCC/
Cp/2011/l.9 (Dec. 10, 2011); UNFCCC, Draft Dec. -/CP/17, Outcome of the 
Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under  
the Convention (Advance Unedited Version), http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/
durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/cop17_lcaoutcome.pdf.
5 UNFCCC, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban  
Platform for Enhanced Action, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/L.10 (Dec. 10, 2011).
6 See Janet Redman, Durban’s Climate Debacle, foReign pol’y in foCus 
(Jan. 5, 2012), http://www.fpif.org/articles/durbans_climate_debacle; Politicians  
Listen to the Polluters at UN Climate Talks, gReenpeaCe int’l (Dec. 11, 2011), 
http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/news/features/Politicians-Listen- 
to-the-Polluters-at-UN-climate-talks/.
7 Nina Chestnet & Jon Herskovitz, UN Climate Talks Reach Modest Deal, 
ReuteRs (Dec. 11, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/11/us- 
climate-idUSTRE7B41NH20111211.
8 See John M. Broder, In Glare of Climate Talks, Taking on Too Great a Task, 
n.y. times (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/science/earth/
climate-change-expands-far-beyond-an-environmental-issue.html; Fitrian Adri-
ansyah, Mixed Results from Durban Climate Talks for Indonesia, the JakaRta 
post (Dec. 16. 2011), http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/16/mixed-
results-durban-climate-talks-indonesia.html; David Crossland, The Durban  
Climate Agreement is Almost Useless, spiegel online int’l (Dec. 12, 2011), 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,803158,00.html.
9 See Broder, supra note 8; Crossland, supra note 8.
10 UNFCCC, Draft Dec. –/CP-17, Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group 
on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (Advance Unedited Version), 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/
cop17_durbanplatform.pdf.
11 See, e.g., daniel bodansky & elliot diRingeR, the pew CenteR on global 
Climate Change, the evolution of multilateRal Regimes (2010) (explaining 
the reasons international regimes often develop in an evolutionary manner);  
K. Levin et al., Playing it Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incremental-
ism, and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Global Climate Change, 6 iop Conf. 
seRies: eaRth and envtl. sCi. 502002 (2009).
12 The expression “constructive ambiguity” is generally attributed to Henry 
Kissinger and is widely used in the field of diplomacy. It has been defined 
as “the deliberate use of ambiguous language on a sensitive issue in order to 
advance some political purpose. See G. R. Berridge & Alan James, A Dictionary 
of Diplomacy (July 21, 2008), http://grberridge.diplomacy.edu/dict_comp_a_e.htm.
13 See HE Patricia Espinosa, Sec’y of Foreign Affairs, Mex., Address at the 
Chathham House: From Cancun to Durban: Implications for Climate and  
Multilateral Diplomacy (June 30, 2011), http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/
default/files/300611espinosa.pdf.
14 Scientific estimates indicate that emission pathways consistent with a “likely” 
chance (i.e. greater than sixty-six percent) of meeting the two degree Celsius goal 
“generally peak before 2020, have emission levels in 2020 around 44 GtCO2e 
(range: 39-44 GtCO2e), have steep emission reductions afterwards and/or reach 
negative emissions in the longer term.” See UNEP, the emissions gap RepoRt: 
aRe the Copenhagen aCCoRd pledges suffiCient to limit global waRming to 
2° C oR 1.5°? (Nov. 2010), http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsga-
preport/pdfs/EMISSIONS_GAP_TECHNICAL_SUMMARY.pdf.
15 See id. (noting the concern revealed in the recent UN reports regarding the 
difficulty maintaining the average temperature rise within two degrees Celsius).
16 See Summary of the Durban Climate Change Conference, eaRth  
negotiations bull. (Dec. 2011), http://www.iisd.ca/download/pdf/enb12534e.
pdf; Wolfgang Sterk et al., On the Road Again: Progressive Countries Score 
Realpolitik Victory in Durban While the Real Climate Continues to Heat Up, 
wuppeRtal inst. foR Climate, env’t and eneRgy (Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.
wupperinst.org/uploads/tx_wibeitrag/COP17-report.pdf; Edward Cameron & 
Jennifer Morgan, Reflections on COP 17 in Durban, wRi insights (Dec. 16, 
2011), http://insights.wri.org/news/2011/12/reflections-cop-17-durban.
17 See Remi Moncel et al., Building the Climate Change Regime: Survey and 
Analysis of Approaches (World Resources Inst., Working Paper, 2011), at 53, 
available at http://www.unep.org/PDF/PressReleases/UNEP-WRI_Building 
ClimateRegime_ADVANCED.pdf.
